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The effects of networking on the extent of cooperation emerging in a competitive setting are
studied. The evolutionary snowdrift game, which represents a realistic alternative to the well-known
Prisoner’s Dilemma, is studied in the Watts-Strogatz network that spans the regular, small-world,
and random networks through random re-wiring. Over a wide range of payoffs, a re-wired network
is found to suppress cooperation when compared with a well-mixed or fully connected system. Two
extinction payoffs, that characterize the emergence of a homogeneous steady state, are identified. It
is found that, unlike in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the standard deviation of the degree distribution is
the dominant property in a re-wired network that governs the extinction payoffs.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Cc
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory has become an important
tool for investigating and understanding cooperative or
altruistic behavior in systems consisting of competitive
entities. These systems may occur in a wide range of
problems in different disciplines and include physical, bi-
ological, ecological, social, and political systems. Mathe-
maticians, biologists, and physicists alike have found the
phenomena of emergence of cooperative behavior fasci-
nating. Since the ground-breaking work on repeated or
iterated games based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
game by Axelrod [1, 2], there has been a continuous
effort on exploring the determining factors on possible
cooperative behavior in evolutionary games based on
the PD game and its variations [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], with
a recent emphasis on the effects of spatial structures
such as regular lattices [5, 6, 9, 10, 11] and networks
[8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Remarkably, it was found that
cooperation can be induced in a repeated PD game by
cleverly designed strategies. Spatial structures, e.g., lat-
tices or networks, are found to favor cooperative behav-
ior in the evolutionary PD game. The two subjects in-
volved in networked games, i.e., emergence phenomenon
and the physics of networks [18], are among the most
rapidly growing branches in physics.
The present work was motivated by the recent con-
cerns on whether the PD game should be the sole model
for studying emerging cooperative phenomena [6]. Due
to practical difficulties in accurately quantifying the pay-
offs in game theory, the snowdrift game (SG) has been
proposed as possible alternative to the PD game. Previ-
ous work on the SG have focused on the effects of con-
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nectivity in structures such as lattices [6] and fully con-
nected networks [6, 19]. The latter is also referred to as
the well-mixed case in the literature. Here, we investi-
gate the networking effects on an evolutionary snowdrift
game [6, 20, 21] within the Watts-Strogatz (WS) [18, 22]
model of small world constructed by randomly re-wiring
a regular network. Starting with a random mixture of
competing nodes of opposite characters, we found that
(i) the steady-state population may consist of only one
kind of nodes or a mixture of nodes of different charac-
ters, depending on degree K in a regular lattice before
re-wiring and the extent of re-wiring q; (ii) for a wide
range of payoffs, a re-wired network suppresses the frac-
tion of cooperative nodes in the steady state and hence
the overall level of cooperation, when compared with a
fully connected network or well-mixed case; (iii) network-
ing effect on the critical payoffs for the extinction of one
kind of nodes in the steady state depends sensitively on
the width or standard deviation of the degree distribution
induced by re-wiring.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The evolutionary
snowdrift game and the Watts-Strogatz network struc-
ture are introduced in Sec. II. Section III gives the nu-
merical results in regular lattices. Two extinction payoffs
are identified. An analytic expression for the extinction
payoff of defective character is given, together with a dis-
cussion on the discrepancy between observed value and
theoretical value of the extinction payoff for runs with
finite time steps. Section IV gives the numerical results
in re-wired networks. The dependence on the re-wiring
probability is found to be governed by the standard devi-
ation of the degree distribution of the re-wired network.
In Sec. V, we give an approximate expression for the
extinction payoff and summarize our results.
2II. MODEL
The basic snowdrift game, which is equivalent to the
hawk-dove or chicken game [20, 21], is most conveniently
described using the following scenario. Consider two
drivers hurrying home in opposite directions on a road
blocked by a snowdrift. Each driver has two possible ac-
tions – to shovel the snowdrift (cooperate (C)) or not
to do anything (not-to-cooperate or “defect” (D)). This
is similar to the PD game in which each player has two
options: to cooperate or to defect. If the two drivers co-
operate, they could be back home on time and each will
get a reward of b. Shovelling is a laborious job with a
total cost of c. Thus, each driver gets a net reward of
R = b − c/2. If both drivers take action D, they both
get stuck, and each gets a reward of P = 0. If only
one driver takes action C and shovels the snowdrift, then
both drivers can get through. The driver taking action
D (not to shovel) gets home without doing anything and
hence gets a payoff T = b, while the driver taking ac-
tion C gets a “sucker” payoff of S = b − c. The SG is,
therefore, given by the following payoff matrix:
C D
C
D
(
R S
T P
)
.
(1)
The matrix element gives the payoff to a player using a
strategy listed in the left hand column when the opponent
uses a strategy in the top row. The SG refers to the case
b > c > 0, leading to T > R > S > P . This ordering
of the payoffs defines the SG. Without loss of generality,
it is useful to assign R = 1 so that the payoffs can be
characterized by a single parameter r = c/2 = c/(2b− c)
for the cost-to-reward ratio. In terms of 0 < r < 1, we
have T = 1+r, R = 1, S = 1−r, and P = 0. For a player,
the best action is: to take D if the opponent takes C,
otherwise take C. A larger value of r tends to encourage
the action D. The SG becomes the PD when the cost c
is high such that 2b > c > b > 0, which amounts to the
ranking T > R > P > S [23, 24]. Therefore, the SG and
PD game differ only by the ordering of P and S. Due
to the difficulty in measuring payoffs in game theory, the
SD has been proposed to be a possible alternative to the
PD game in studying emerging cooperative phenomena
[6, 19].
Evolutionary snowdrift game amounts to letting the
character of a connected population of inhomogeneous
players evolve, according to their performance [6]. Con-
sider N players represented by the nodes of a network.
Initially, the nodes are randomly assigned to be either
of C or D character. The character of each node is up-
dated every time step simultaneously, according to the
following procedure. At each time step, every node i
interacts with all its connected ki neighbors and gets a
payoff per neighbor V i = Vi/ki, where Vi is obtained by
summing up the ki payoffs after comparing characters
with its neighbors. Here, ki is the degree of node i. Ev-
ery node i then randomly selects a neighbor j for possible
updating or evolution. To compare the performance of
the two nodes i and j, we construct
wij = (Vj − Vi)/(T − P ) = (Vj − Vi)/(1 + r). (2)
If wij > 0, then the character of node i is replaced by the
character of node j with probability wij , and thus node i
becomes the offspring of node j. The denominator (1+r)
in wij is, therefore, included as a normalization factor. If
wij < 0, then the character of node i remains unchanged.
In the long time limit, a state will be attained with possi-
ble coexistence of nodes of both characters. The fraction
of C-nodes fC , which is often called the frequency of co-
operators [6], measures the extent of cooperation in the
whole system and is determined by the structure of the
underlying network and the payoff parameter r. In a fully
connected network, fC = 1−r [6, 19]. In two-dimensional
lattices with nearest-neighboring and next-nearest neigh-
boring connections, it has recently been observed that
the spatial structure tends to lower fC [6], when com-
pared with a fully connected network. In contrast, spa-
tial connections are found to enhance fC in evolutionary
PD games. We note that one may define wij in different
ways. Popular alternatives of wij in evolutionary games
include the use of the total payoff instead of an average
payoff per neighbor for which the effects of a spread in the
degrees of different nodes will be much more prominent
and allowing for the possibility of replacing the character
of a node by that of a neighboring node with lower pay-
off. In our choice of wij , a node will only have a chance
to be replaced if it encounters a better performing node.
The physics of complex networks [18] is a fascinating
research area of current interest. Here, the nodes in an
evolutionary SG are connected in the form of the Watts-
Strogatz [22] small-world model. Starting with a one-
dimensional regular world consisting of a circular chain,
i.e., periodic boundary condition, of N nodes with each
node having a degree 2K connecting to its 2K nearest
neighbors, each of the K links to the right hand side of
a node is cut and re-wired to a randomly chosen node
with a probability q. This simple model gives the small
world effect [22], which refers to the commonly observed
phenomena of small separations between two randomly
chosen nodes in many real-life networks [18], for q ∼ 0.1.
The parameter q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1) thus takes the network
from a regular world through the small world to a random
world, with a fixed mean degree 〈k〉 = 2K. Here, we aim
at understanding how the frequency of cooperators fC
behaves as the parameters characterizing the the spatial
structure K and q change, and as the payoff parameter
r characterizing the evolutionary dynamics changes.
III. RESULTS: REGULAR WORLD
Figure 1(a) shows fC as a function of r in regular lat-
tices (q = 0) of N = 103 nodes with different values of
K. The dashed line gives the result fC = 1 − r for the
well-mixed case. The key features are: (i) there exists a
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FIG. 1: (Color online) (a) The frequency of cooperators fC
as a function of the payoff parameter r in a one-dimensional
Watts-Strogatz network of size N = 103 nodes with K = 1, 2,
3, 10 before re-wiring (q = 0). The run time is 104 time steps.
The dashed line indicates the result fC = 1 − r for a fully
connected network. (b) The extinction payoff rD(K, q = 0)
as a function of K. (c) The extinction payoff rC(K, q = 0) as
a function of K.
value rD(K, q = 0) so that fC = 1 for r < rD, i.e., the
extinction of D-nodes and all nodes become cooperative
in nature, (ii) for r < rD, fC is enhanced when com-
pared with the well-mixed case, (iii) for a wide range of
r, the frequency of cooperators drops below that in the
well-mixed case, (iv) there exists a value rC(K, q = 0) so
that fC = 0 for r > rC , i.e., the extinction of cooperative
nodes [25]. These extinction payoffs thus characterize
a transition between a homogeneous and an inhomoge-
neous population as the payoff r is varied. Figures 1(b)
and 1(c) show that the extinction payoff for defectors (co-
operators) rD (rC) decreases (increases) monotonically
with K in regular lattices. Numerically, it is found that
for K = 1, 2, rD(K, q = 0) is close to 1/2K; while for
K ≥ 3, rD(K, q = 0) is closer to 1/(2K+1). In addition,
we observe that for K ≥ 3, the relation 2rD + rC ≈ 1 is
satisfied. The feature (iii) is analogous to that observed
in two-dimensional lattices [6]. We have also found that
rD and rC are independent of the number of nodes N , as
long as N ≫ 1. As the shortest path L = N/4K scales
with N in regular lattices, the results imply that the K-
dependence of the extinction payoffs does not come from
L, although L is an important quantity in the description
of networks. Clearly, the time it takes the system from
the initial configuration to that in the long time limit
would depend on N and hence L.
Analytically, the value of rD(K, q = 0) can be esti-
mated as follows. Recall that a higher value of r pro-
motes D-character and rD refers to the highest value of
r below which no D-node exists. Since replacements are
carried out probabilistically, it is, therefore, important to
consider cases where there are only a few D-nodes and
how these patterns will be replaced. Note that for any
value of K, a single D-node in an otherwise C-node envi-
ronment will not be replaced. The reason is the following.
The average payoff for the single D-node is VD = 1 + r.
Note that only the C-nodes that are connected to the D-
node may be involved in a possible evolution. For these
C-nodes, their average payoff VC(1D) = 1− r/2K, where
the subscript indicate that it is the average payoff for a
C-node that is linked to one D-node. Thus, for the whole
range of r, VD > VC(1D) and thus a single D-node will
not be replaced by its connected C-neighbors.
This leads us to consider the patterns involving D-
nodes, called the last surviving patterns, that can be re-
placed by C-nodes in one time step. The case of K = 1
serves to illustrate the key ideas in estimating rD. For
K = 1, the single D-node pattern will be evolved into one
with a pair of neighboring D-nodes. The chain becomes
that of ...CCCCDDCCCC.... Because each D-node has
a D-neighbor and the D-D payoff is P = 0, the average
payoff of the D-nodes becomes VD = (1 + r)/2. The
payoff of the C-nodes that are linked to a D-node is
VC(1D) = 1 − r/2. By equating VD and VC(1D), we ob-
tain an estimate of rD = 1/2 for K = 1, which agrees
with numerical results. For r < 1/2, VC(1D) > VD and
thus the D-D dimer pattern may evolve into an all-C
chain, provided that both D-nodes randomly pick the
neighboring C-node and evolve into C-character with the
probability wij in the same time step. Thus, the key fea-
tures for a last surviving pattern are: (i) we need at least
two connected D-nodes, and (ii) the C-nodes that are
connected to only one of these surviving D-nodes have
a higher chance to replace the D-nodes. The discussion
also serves to point out the importance of run time in
numerical studies. When the system evolves to the last
surviving pattern, the pattern may or may not evolve into
an all-C pattern. It only happens probabilistically. The
time it takes, even when r < rD, for the all-C pattern to
emerge depends on the values of r and K. For r → rD
and for larger values of K, the time may be exceedingly
long so that a smaller value of rD than that theoretically
allowed will be determined numerically.
Extending the argument to K = 2 regular lattices,
a single D-node will evolve into one of the last sur-
viving patterns shown in Figure 2. In both patterns,
there are two types of neighboring C-nodes. For the C-
nodes connected to only one D-node, the average pay-
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FIG. 2: Two last surviving patterns in K = 2 regular lat-
tices for estimating the extinction payoff rD. Typically, these
patterns consist of two connected D-nodes in a background
of C-nodes. The C-nodes connected to one D-node (labelled
C(1D)) and connected to two D-nodes (labelled C(2D)) have
different average payoffs. rD is found by equating the average
payoffs VC(1D) and VD.
off VC(1D) = 1 − r/4. For the C-nodes connected to
two D-nodes, VC(2D) = 1 − r/2. For the D-nodes,
VD = 3(1 + r)/4. Note that in general VC(1D) > VC(2D).
Since there are more C-nodes with one D-neighbor in the
pattern in Figure 2(a) than Figure 2(b), the D-nodes in
Figure 2(a) are most likely to be the last surviving pat-
tern in numerical simulations. There are two values of r
that are of interest. For r < 1/5 = 1/(2K + 1), we have
VC(1D) > VC(2D) > VD. Therefore, all the neighboring C-
nodes have a finite probability to replace the two D-nodes
in one time step. This is why it is easier to observe an all-
C pattern for r < 1/5. In principle, rD can be found by
equating VC(1D) and VD, giving rD = 1/4. However, for
1/5 < r < 1/4, we have VC(1D) > VD > VC(2D). These
inequalities imply that even if we arrive at the patterns
in Figure 2, the chance of replacing both D-nodes by C-
character is small, since only the C-nodes connected to
one D-node can carry out the replacement. Instead, the
D-nodes may replace the C-nodes linked to both D-nodes
to arrive at a pattern with more D-nodes. This prevents
the all-C pattern from emerging in any run of reason-
ably long run time. This effect is obviously more severe
as K increases, as there will be more C-nodes with two
D-neighbors.
Generalizing the argument to arbitrary value of K, we
have VD = (1 + r)(1 − 1/2K) and VC(1D) = 1 − r/2K.
Thus, in principle, rD(K, q = 0) = 1/2K. However,
for any practical run times, the all-C pattern is hard to
observe for 1/(2K + 1) < r < 1/(2K), except for K = 1
and 2. Thus, the numerical results in Figure 1, which are
obtained by fixing the run time to be t = 104 time steps,
give rD ≈ 1/(2K + 1) for K ≥ 3. We have tried longer
run times, e.g., 3 × 105 time steps, and the value of rD
only tends to approach the value 1/2K very slowly.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) (a) The frequency of cooperators fC
as a function of the the payoff parameter r in Watts-Strogatz
networks of K = 3 for different values of the re-wiring prob-
ability q = 0, 0.01, 0.3, 1.0. The dashed line indicates the
result fC = 1 − r for a fully connected network. (b) The ex-
tinction payoff rD(K, q) as a function of q for K = 3. (c) The
extinction payoff rC(K, q) as a function of q for K = 3.
IV. RESULTS: WATTS-STROGATZ RE-WIRED
NETWORKS
Going beyond regular lattices, Figure 3(a) shows fC
as a function of r in Watts-Strogatz (WS) networks with
different re-wiring probabilities q = 0.01, 0.3 and 1.0.
The network consists of N = 103 nodes and K = 3, with
the run time fixed at t = 104 time steps. Results in a reg-
ular lattice (q = 0) and fully connected networks (dashed
line) are also included for comparison. It is noted that
the effect of increasing q for fixed K is similar to in-
creasing K for fixed q = 0 (regular lattices). The main
features are that as q increases, the extinction payoff rD
decreases and the fC is higher than that in a regular
lattice with the same value of K for a large range of r.
Figures 3(b) and (c) show that, for fixed K = 3, the ex-
tinction payoff rD (rC) drops (rises) with the re-wiring
probability q. We have checked that while the shortest
path L(q) changes sensitively with q, it is however not
the determining factor for the extinction payoffs. Will
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The extinction payoff rD(K, q) is plot-
ted against q for different values of K = 3, 4, 5. The results
are obtained by runs of 3× 105 time steps. The lines are ob-
tained by fitting to a form given by Eq.(4). The inset gives
the dependence of the fitting parameter a(K) on K.
the clustering coefficient C matter? For regular lattices,
C increases with K and saturates at large K following
C(0) = 3(2K − 2)/[4(2K − 1)] [18, 22]. If the drop in rD
with K in regular lattices were attributed to the increase
in C, then one would have expected rD to increase with q
as C(q) ≃ C(0)(1− q)3 decreases with q in WS networks
[18, 22]. This is, however, not what is observed in numer-
ical results. Therefore, the clustering coefficient C is also
not a determining factor for rD and rC . These observa-
tions are in sharp contrast to the networking effects in
evolutionary PD games [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Noting that
the WS networks have a fixed 〈k〉 = 2K with or without
re-wiring, rD and rC cannot be determined by the mean
degree 〈k〉. Thus, rD and rC are not determined by the
commonly studied quantities in networks.
The results in Figures 1 and 3 revealed that the ex-
tinction payoffs rD(K, q) and rC(K, q) depend on both
the structural parameters K and q. It does remain an
intriguing problem of which geometrical property (prop-
erties) of a re-wired network determines rD and rC in the
Watts-Strogatz networks. In what follows, we will focus
on analyzing rD(K, q), as rC ≈ 1 − 2rD. Figure 4 shows
collectively the numerical results (symbols) of rD(K, q)
for different values of K and q, for a longer fixed run
time of 3 × 105 time steps. As discussed, the numerical
results for rD(K, q = 0) in a regular lattice may not come
out to be 1/2K even using a longer run time, we could
avoid this problem and focus on the effects of re-wiring,
i.e., q 6= 0, by exploring the behavior of the difference
in rD(K, q) and rD(K, 0). Interestingly, we found that
by plotting (1/rD(K, q) − 1/rD(K, q = 0)) as a function
of q, the numerical data for different values of K basi-
cally follow the same functional form, as shown by the
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FIG. 5: (Color online) By suitably choosing the quantity on
the y-axis, the set of scattered data in Fig. 4 can be shown to
follow a similar functional dependence on q. The dependence
is found to follow that of
√
2q − q2 in the standard deviation
of the degree distribution in Watts-Strogatz networks after
re-wiring for fixed K. The lines are obtained by using the
fitting parameters obtained in Fig. 4.
symbols in Figure 5. Examining the q-dependence, we
notice that the behavior is similar to that in the stan-
dard deviation σ(K, q) of the degree distribution P (k)
in the Watts-Strogatz networks. The re-wiring process
changes P (k) gradually from a delta-function at k = 2K
for q = 0 to a distribution that has a lower cutoff at
k = K with a finite σ(K, q) that increases with q [18].
More specifically,
σ(K, q) =
√
K ·
√
2q − q2, (3)
which follows from the degree distribution of the Watts-
Strogatz model. Motivated by this observation, we use
the numerical data in Figure 4 and perform a fit to the
functional form
rD(K, q) =
1
1
rD(K,0)
+ a(K)σ(K, q)
, (4)
where a(K) is a fitting parameter. The first term in the
denominator of Eq. (4) imposes the restriction that the
fitted line must pass through the q = 0 data point. The
fitted lines are also shown in Figure 4. With only one
fitting parameter for each value ofK, the lines fit the data
accurately. This implies that the q-dependence follows
that in σ(K, q). The fitting parameters are found to be
a(3) = 2.154, a(4) = 1.910, and a(5) = 1.847. Note that
a(K) drops with K (see inset in Fig. 4). Since σ(K, q)
carries a factor of
√
K, the combination b(K) = a(K)
√
K
becomes quite insensitive to K, with b increasing from
3.73 for K = 3 to 4.13 for K = 5. As a consistency
check, we also plot the fitted lines in Figure 5, using the
6same coefficients a(K) as obtained in Figure 4. Note
that even for q = 1, the spread in the data and fitted
lines is small, reflecting the weak K-dependence in the
coefficients b(K). The extinction payoff is thus found to
be described by
1
rD(K, q)
=
1
rD(K, q = 0)
+ b(K)
√
2q − q2, (5)
where b carries only a weak K-dependence. Our results
on the extinction payoff rD(K, q) in the Watts-Strogatz
networks can be summarized as follows. The depen-
dence on K is dominated by that in rD(K, q = 0) and
the q-dependence follows that of the standard deviation
σ(K, q) of the degree distribution.
V. DISCUSSION
Our analytic approach in getting rD in regular lat-
tices (see Sec. III) can also be applied to re-wired net-
works. The difference is that in a re-wired network, dif-
ferent nodes may have different number of neighbors, i.e.,
different degrees. Again, we consider a last surviving
pattern with two connected D-nodes with otherwise C-
neighbors. Let kD be the degree of one of the D-nodes.
Therefore, this D-node has (kD−1) C-neighbors and one
D-neighbor. Let kC be the degree of one of these C-
neighbors or the typical degree of these C-neighbors. We
assume that the C-nodes are only connected to one D-
node, as they are the ones more likely to replace the
D-nodes. For the D-node, the average payoff is:
VD =
kD − 1
kD
+
(kD − 1)r
kD
, (6)
while for the C-node, the average payoff is:
VC = 1− r
kC
. (7)
For regular lattices, kC = kD = 2K and rD = 1/2K is
recovered when we equate VD to VC . In addition, as K
increases in a regular lattice, rD → 0, which is the result
in the well-mixed case. In general, equating Eq. (6) and
Eq. (7) gives
r′D =
kC
(kD − 1)kC + kD . (8)
The meaning of r′D is that, if a last surviving pattern
of the considered structure is approached in a numerical
simulation, then for r < r′D, such a pattern may become
all-C in one time step.
Equation (8) suggests several possibilities on estimat-
ing rD. A lower bound of rD can be constructed by
noting that a D-node occupying a node of high degree
can take advantage of the many C-neighbors and hence
requires a lower value of r to replace it. Similarly, a sur-
rounding C-node with fewer C-neighbors has lower aver-
age payoff and hence is harder to replace the D-nodes.
Let kmax(K, q) be the maximum degree in a re-wired
network for given K and q. The minimum degree in a
Watts-Strogatz network is close to K after re-wiring. An
extreme (but rare) case is that of a D-node occupying a
degree with kmax being surrounded by C-nodes that oc-
cupy nodes with degree K. A more reasonable assump-
tion is to take the degree of the C-nodes as the mean
degree 2K, as any one of the C-nodes may be picked in
the evolution step. We can substitute kD = kmax(K, q)
and kC = 2K to get an estimate of a lower bound
rlowerD =
2K
2K(kmax(K, q)− 1) + kmax(K, q) . (9)
We have checked that Eq. (9) indeed gives values that
are lower than numerical results. More interestingly,
kmax(K, q) turns out to depend on q through the stan-
dard deviation σ(K, q) [26] . Hence, Eq. (9) does repro-
duce the drop of rD as q increases, as observed in Fig.4.
It is also possible to relate Eq. (8) to Eqs. (4) and (5).
Assuming that, after averaging over runs in numerical
studies, that kC and kD can both be approximated as
some typical degree kave(K, q), then Eq. (8) suggests
that the extinction payoff would be
rD =
1
kave(K, q)
. (10)
Since the dynamics in evolutionary SG depends on the
average payoffs, which in turn depends on the geometri-
cal structure of the neighborhood of a node, we expect
in general kave is different from the mean degree 2K. In-
stead, D-node tends to survive easily by staying on nodes
of higher degree. Comparing Eq.(10) with Eq. (4), we
notice that the fitted result to numerical data implies
that
kave(K, q) =
1
rD(K, q = 0)
+ a(K)σ(K, q). (11)
where the first term should in principle be 2K.
In summary, we investigated the extent of cooperation
that would emerge in a networked evolutionary snowdrift
game. The random re-wiring model of Watts and Stro-
gatz is used. Comparing to a fully connected network, a
spatial structure of regular lattices suppresses fC over a
wide range of the payoff r and re-wiring lowers the sup-
pression. We identified two extinction payoffs rD and
rC . For regular lattices, rD should take on the value
of 1/2K, although a value closer to 1/(2K + 1) is usu-
ally observed in numerical studies. The dependence of
rD(K, q) on K and q is highly non-trivial. The key net-
work property that gives the q-dependence is found to be
the standard deviation of the degree distribution. This
finding, in turn, implies that it is the existence of nodes
with higher degrees due to randomly re-wiring that plays
a dominant role in determining the extinction payoffs.
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